















of	 legislative	hyperactivity	 involving	constant	changes	 to	the	Bail	Act	1978	(NSW),	changes	
which	remove	or	restrict	the	presumption	in	favour	of	bail	for	a	wide	range	of	offences.	The	
article	will	then	examine	some	of	the	conceptual,	cultural	and	practice	shifts	underlying	the	
increase.	 These	 include:	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 a	 conception	 of	 bail	 as	 a	 procedural	 issue	
predominantly	 concerned	 with	 securing	 the	 attendance	 of	 the	 accused	 at	 trial	 and	 the	
integrity	of	the	trial,	to	the	use	of	bail	for	crime	prevention	purposes;	the	diminishing	force	of	
the	 presumption	 of	 innocence;	 the	 framing	 of	 a	 false	 opposition	 between	 an	 individual	
interest	in	liberty	and	a	public	interest	in	safety;	a	shift	from	determination	of	the	individual	
case	by	 reference	 to	 its	own	particular	 circumstances	 to	determination	by	 its	 classification	
within	 pre‐set	 legislative	 categories	 of	 offence	 types	 and	 previous	 convictions;	 a	 double	
jeopardy	effect	arising	 in	 relation	 to	people	with	previous	 convictions	 for	which	 they	have	
already	been	punished;	and	an	unacknowledged	preventive	detention	effect	arising	from	the	
increased	emphasis	on	risk.	Many	of	these	conceptual	shifts	are	apparent	in	the	explosion	in	
bail	 conditions	 and	 the	 KPI‐driven	 policing	 of	 bail	 conditions	 and	 consequent	 rise	 in	
revocations,	especially	in	relation	to	juveniles.	
	

















fallen	 to	 168	 per	 100,000	 adult	 population	 (ABS	 2012:	 8).	 Imprisonment	 rates	 vary	
considerably	 across	 the	 jurisdictions,	 from	825.5	 per	100,000	 in	 the	Northern	Territory	 (NT)	
followed	 by	 267.3	 in	 Western	 Australia	 (WA),	 171.2	 in	 New	 South	 Wales	 (NSW),	 158.9	 in	
Queensland	(Qld)	and	111.7	in	Victoria	(Vic)	(ABS	2012:	Table	3.3).		
	
A	 significant	 component	 of	 the	 increase	 in	 imprisonment	 rates	 has	 been	 the	 rise	 in	 people	
remanded	in	custody.	Nationally,	as	at	30	June	2012,	23.4%	of	prisoners	(6,871	out	of	29,381)	
were	 remanded	 in	 custody:	 that	 is,	 were	 unconvicted.	 (ABS	 2012:	 Table	 3.1)	 This	 figure	
significantly	understates	the	position	as	it	is	based	on	the	traditional	snapshot	style,	‘on	one	day’	
prison	census	figures.	If	the	proportion	of	remand	prisoners	was	calculated	as	a	percentage	of	
prison	 receptions	 (a	 figure	 not	 provided	 in	 ABS	 or	 other	 national	 statistics),	 then	 the	 figure	
would	 be	 far	 higher.	 In	NSW	 in	 2010,	 for	 example,	 remand	prisoners	made	up	10,342	out	 of	
14,288	prison	receptions,	or	72.4%	of	the	total	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	4.6).		
	
Nationally,	 the	 remand	 rate	 of	 unsentenced	prisoners	per	100,000	of	population	has	doubled	
from	18.9	in	1998	to	38.8	in	2011	(NSW	LRC	2012:	Table	F.2,	338).	There	have	been	increases	
in	remand	in	custody	rates	 	 in	all	 jurisdictions	over	that	period	as	 follows:	NSW,	22.2	to	49.1;	
Vic,	12.9	to	19.6;	Qld,	18.4	to	33.4;	South	Australia	(SA),	22.8	to	52.1;	WA,	21.3	to	46.8;	Tasmania	
(Tas),	8.8	to	21.5;	NT,	59.5	to	169	(NSW	LRC	2012).	Remand	imprisonment	has	increased	faster	
than	 the	 sentenced	 imprisonment	 rate.	 In	2012	unsentenced	prisoners	as	a	proportion	of	 the	
total	prison	population	 ranged	between	roughly	one	 fifth	and	one	 third	across	 the	Australian	
jurisdictions	 as	 follows:	 NSW,	 25.7%;	 Vic,	 20.4%;	 Qld,	 22.3%;	 SA,	 31.3%;	 WA,	 19.6%;	 Tas,	







unsentenced	 prisoners	 as	 a	 proportion	 of	 the	 total	 prison	 population	 comprised	 11.5%,	
increasing	 to	 22.7%	 by	 2010	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	 4.3).	 NSW	 remand	 in	 custody	 numbers	
increased	 from	711	 in	1995	 to	2502	 in	2010	 (NSW	LRC	2012:	Table	4.1).	NSW	remand	rates	
increased	from	around	16	to	45	per	100,000	of	population	between	1994	and	2010	(NSW	LRC	
2012:	Figure	4.3).	The	percentage	of	adult	Indigenous	remandees	in	NSW	increased	from	11.5%	








of	Corrections	2011:	22)	 In	Canada	 the	 remand	population	 increased	 as	 a	 rate	 from	12.6	per	
100,000	 to	 39.1	 in	 2007	 (Webster,	 Doob	 and	 Myers	 2009:	 80),	 with	 half	 of	 all	 provincial	
prisoners	on	remand,	while	the	imprisonment	rate	generally	remained	stable	or	decreased.	In	
2009‐2010	 adults	 on	 remand	 constituted	 58%	 of	 the	 total	 prison	 population	 (Porter	 and	
Calverley	2011:	2).	Youth	on	remand	also	outnumbered	those	in	sentenced	custody	in	2010	for	
the	 third	 year	 in	 a	 row	 (Porter	 and	 Calverley	 2011:	 11).	 By	way	 of	 contrast,	 in	 England	 and	












and	 the	 difficulty	 in	 identifying	 uniform	 drivers	 when	 attempting	 to	 explain	 increases	 (or	
stability)	 in	 remand	rates.	 In	Canada,	Webster	et	 al.	 (2009)	note	 the	 significant	differences	 in	
remand	rates	across	different	provinces;	 the	 fact	 that	 the	bail	process	 is	 taking	 longer	 than	 it	
did,	in	part	through	increased	adjournments;	the	larger	proportion	of	defendants	appearing	in	
court	 from	 custody;	 and	 increasing	 length	 of	 time	 on	 remand.	 While	 rejecting	 an	 ‘increased	
punitiveness’	thesis,	on	the	basis	that	imprisonment	rates	had	remained	stable,	they	argued	that	
‘Canada’s	 growing	 remand	 population	 is	 largely	 the	 product	 of	 an	 increasing	 culture	 of	 risk	
aversion	which	 is	 permeating	 the	 entire	 criminal	 justice	 system’	 so	 that	 ‘decisions	 are	 either	
being	 continually	 passed	 along	 to	 someone	 else	 or	 simply	 delayed	 by	 those	 responsible	 for	
them’	(Webster	et	al.	2009:	99).		
	
The	 leading	 Australian	 research	 on	 factors	 influencing	 bail	 decision‐making	 noted	 that	 the	
legislative	 framework	 in	 the	 two	 jurisdictions	 in	 the	study	 (South	Australia	and	Victoria)	was	
broadly	 similar.	 The	 research	 identified	 lower	 remand	 rates	 in	 Victoria	 as	 ‘associated	 with	
enhanced	 police	 accountability	 for	 bail	 refusal,	 improved	 feedback	 loops	 between	 courts	 and	
police,	higher	transaction	costs	for	custodial	remand,	and	longer	bail	hearings’	(Sarre,	King	and	
Bamford	2006:	5).	The	authors	suggested	that:	‘the	key	to	isolating	the	critical	factors	affecting	
remand	 in	 custody	 trends’	 lay	 in	 ‘a	 focus	on,	 and	analyses	of,	 the	decisions	made	by	 the	non‐
judicial	participants	in	the	process,	especially	the	police	decision‐making	and	information	they	
bring	 to	 the	 courts’	 (Sarre,	 King	 and	 Bamford	 2006:	 6).	 Later	 work	 identified	 the	 key	 to	
understanding	 the	 different	 patterns	 as	 ‘recognising	 the	 way	 that	 the	 discretion	 of	 remand	




…	 jurisdictions	 develop	 cultures	 around	 remand	 decision‐making	 as	 a	 result	 of	
the	 intersection	 of	 these	 contexts	 and	 that	 this	 culture	 is	 perpetuated	 by	 the	
beliefs	 of	 the	 remand	 decision‐makers	 about	 their	 roles,	 and	 the	 processes	 of	




whereas	 in	 Victoria	 it	 was	 18	 minutes’	 (King,	 Bamford	 and	 Sarre	 2008:	 26;	 Sarre,	 King	 and	




of	 the	 key	 drivers;	 will	 posit	 some	 suggested	 conceptual,	 cultural	 and	 practice	 shifts,	 and	






 increasing	 rates	 of	 bail	 refusal	 in	both	Local	 (5%	 in	1995	 to	9%	 in	2009)	 and	Higher	
Courts	(24.5%	in	1994	to	33.4%	in	2010);		
 an	increase	in	the	average	(mean)	time	spent	on	remand;		













as	 ‘unconvicted’	 or	 not	 subject	 to	 further	 custodial	 sentence,	 that	 is,	 they	were	




Nearly	 two‐thirds	 of	 the	 5,218	 people	 released	 to	 custody	 as	 unconvicted	 in	 2010	 spent	 less	




time	 before	 release	 on	 bail	 or	 who	 are	 discharged	 upon	 conviction,	 have	 the	 potential	 to	
substantially	reduce	the	prison	reception	rate;	reduce	the	overall	 imprisonment	rate;	 take	the	




While	 the	Bamford,	King	and	Sarre	study	noted	above	 found	 little	difference	 in	 the	 legislative	
provisions	governing	bail	in	South	Australia	and	Victoria,	the	frequency	of	amendments	to	the	
NSW	legislation	since	1979	when	the	reform‐oriented	Bail	Act	1978	came	into	force	constitutes	
a	 form	 of	 legislative	 hyperactivity	 which	 is	 exceptional.	 The	 constant	 amendments	 have	
contributed	 directly	 to	 the	 increased	 remand	 rates	 and	 to	 the	 shifting	 culture	 around	 bail	
decision‐making.	The	NSW	LRC	noted	that	between	1979	and	2011	there	had	been	85	separate	
amending	 Acts,	 some	 of	 which	 contained	 multiple	 amendments.	 The	 LRC	 classified	 the	
amendments	into	four	categories.	Firstly	there	were	‘terminological	or	technical’	changes	which	
included	 updating	 of	 references	 to	 offences	 and	 changes	 in	 criminal	 procedure,	 comprising	
some	 41	 amending	 Acts	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	 3.35).	 Secondly	 ‘machinery	 or	 procedural’	
changes,	 of	 which	 there	 were	 19,	 dealt	 with	 issues	 such	 as	 appeal	 procedures,	 the	 most	
significant	 of	 which	 were	 the	 restrictions	 on	 repeat	 bail	 applications	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	
3.36).	Thirdly	‘therapeutic	concerns’	comprising	three	amending	Acts,	involved	schemes	such	as	
the	Magistrates	Early	Referral	into	Treatment	(MERIT)	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	3.38).	The	fourth	
and	most	 significant	 category	was	of	 28	Acts	 amending	 the	presumptions	 and	 considerations	









…	 some	 of	 these	 changes,	 such	 as	 provisions	 in	 relation	 to	 domestic	 violence	
offences,	followed	research	and	detailed	consideration,	consultation	and	debate.	













or	more	 indictable	 offences.	 The	 stated	 intention	 of	 the	 legislation	was	 to	 reduce	 the	 rate	 of	
absconding	 on	 bail	 following	 a	 NSW	 BOCSAR	 study	 (Chilvers,	 Allen	 and	 Doak	 2002)	 which	
showed	higher	absconding	rates	among	persons	with	prior	convictions	and	multiple	concurrent	
offences.	A	BOCSAR	evaluation	of	 these	changes	showed	that	 they	had	the	effect	of	 increasing	
the	rate	of	bail	refusal	by	10.3%	for	those	with	prior	convictions,	7.3%	for	those	appearing	with	
an	 indictable	 offence	 with	 a	 prior	 indictable	 conviction;	 15.5%	 for	 defendants	 who	 had	
previously	 failed	 to	 appear;	 and	 14.4%	 for	 Indigenous	 adults	 (Fitzgerald	 and	 Weatherburn	
2004:	1).	The	 later	Act	 targeting	repeat	property	offenders	extended	 the	presumption	against	





The	 ‘exceptional’	 nature	 of	NSW	developments	was	 noted	 by	 Steel	 (2009)	who	 compiled	 the	





















before	 our	 courts	 time	 and	 again.	 Part	 of	 those	 changes	 includes	 removing	 the	
presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 bail	 for	 a	 large	 number	 of	 crimes.	 We	 have	 also	
introduced	 presumptions	 against	 bail	 for	 crimes	 including	 drug	 importation,	
firearm	 offences,	 repeat	 property	 offences	 and	 riots,	 and	 an	 even	 more	




















amendments	 to	 the	Bail	Act	 1978	 (NSW).	While	 similar	 trends	were	 apparent	 in	 other	 states	
and	 Territories,	 NSW	 was	 exceptional,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 what	 Steel	 (2009)	 calls	
‘punitive’	amendments.	The	effects	of	these	amendments	were	spelt	out	in	unapologetic	terms	
by	 the	 NSW	Attorney	 General	 in	 2007,	 quoted	 above.	 These	 effects	 have	 not	 come	 about	 by	
accident	 or	 as	 a	 side	 effect;	 they	 have	 largely	 been	 intended	 consequences	 of	 the	 desire	 to	







and	 protect	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 trial	 process	 against	 interference	 with	 witnesses	 or	 the	
destruction	of	 evidence,	 to	a	 substantive,	 independent	 forum	 in	which	crime	prevention	aims	
are	pursued.	While	often	not	explicit,	crime	prevention	is	pursued	through	the	rise	of	risk‐based	
mentalities,	 manifested	 for	 example	 in	 the	 increased	 legislative	 emphasis	 on	 categories	 of	
offence	and	on	previous	convictions,	as	grounds	for	bail	refusal.	These	categories	of	offence	and	
prior	convictions	stand	in	as	very	general	markers	of	risk	in	a	number	of	senses.	First	there	is	
the	 actual	 risk	 of	 absconding,	 interfering	 with	 witnesses	 or	 evidence,	 or	
reoffending/threatening	 community	 safety;	 second	 the	 risk	 to	 broad	 notions	 of	 community	
fears	 and	anxieties;	 and	 third	 the	political	 risk	 to	governments	of	 serious	offences	 committed	
whilst	 on	 bail.	 While	 the	 first	 of	 these	 forms	 of	 risk	 is	 ostensibly	 focused	 on	 the	 individual	
accused,	 the	 elaborate	 legislative	 schema	 of	 presumptions	 based	 on	 offence	 type	 serves	 to	
deflect	that	focus	onto	the	accused’s	membership	of	pre‐set,	 legislatively	defined	categories	or	
populations.	 The	 second	 and	 third	 forms	 of	 risk	 are	 not	 specifically	 within	 the	 realm	 of	
legitimate	legal	considerations	in	a	court	room	setting.	Nevertheless	they	conceivably	operate	at	
a	more	nebulous	 contextual	 level	 in	 relation	 to	 the	mentalities	 and	practices	of	bail	 decision‐
makers	 such	as	police,	magistrates	and	 judges,	 tending	 to	produce	more	cautious,	 risk	averse	























on	prior	 legislatively	determined	categories	of	offence	and	offender.	 In	short	 it	 is	a	shift	 from	
approaching	the	accused	as	a	specific	individual	before	the	court	(what	we	might	call	individual	
justice)	 to	 treating	 the	 individual	 as	 a	 member	 of	 a	 legislatively	 determined	 category	 or	
population.	 The	 alleged	 offender	 is	 judged	 or	 assessed,	 not	 against	 their	 individual	
circumstances,	 but	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 population	 or	 category	 that	 is	 legislatively,	 rather	 than	
judicially,	assumed	to	present	a	higher	risk	of	non‐attendance	and	of	reoffending	whilst	on	bail.	















the	 case’	 involves	 the	 exercise	 of	 ‘a	 broad	discretion.	An	 overly	 prescriptive	 approach	 to	 bail	
creates	 complexity	 and	 inflexibility	 for	 decision‐makers’	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	 2.28).	 The	
Commission	agreed	with	an	earlier	Victorian	Law	Reform	Commission	Report	(VLRC	2007)	that	
‘a	 simpler	 Bail	 Act	 based	 on	 fundamental	 principles	would	 best	 accommodate	 the	 important	






mechanism	 for	 assuring	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 forthcoming	 trial	 at	 which	 culpability	 will	 be	
determined	but	as	a	platform	of	adjudication	in	its	own	right,	where	crime	prevention	and	other	
sentencing,	 control	 and	 therapeutic	 aims	 can	 be	 pursued,	 the	 more	 the	 presumption	 of	
innocence	is	undermined.	This	diminution	in	awareness	of	and	commitment	to	the	presumption	
of	innocence	is	exemplified	in	the	NSW	Attorney	General’s	parliamentary	speech	quoted	above	




to	 NSW.	 In	 a	 study	 of	 policing	 bail	 conditions	 in	 Victoria,	 police	 persistently	 referred	 to	 the	
accused	as	the	‘offender’	(Colvin	2009:	51)	These	examples	of	the	erosion	of	the	presumption	of	
innocence	 in	 daily	 practice	 and	 language	 underscores	 the	 important	 discussion	 in	 the	 NSW	
LRC’s	Bail	 report	 of	 the	 fundamental	 principles	underlying	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	These	
were	 seen	 as	 including:	 the	 right	 to	 personal	 liberty;	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence;	 no	











one	 hand,	 ‘balancing’	 the	 personal	 interests	 of	 the	 accused	 person	 against,	 on	 the	 other,	 the	
collective,	 public	 or	 societal	 interest	 in	 safety	 or	 protection	 from	 crime.	 This	 is	 a	 serious	
misconception	which	has	significant	effects	on	public,	media,	political	and	legal	debate	and	the	









or	 public	 interests.	 [But]	 the	 interest	 in	 liberty	 and	 fundamental	 principles	 is	
correctly	 seen	 as	 a	 collective,	 social,	 public	 interest.	 The	 issue	 then	 is	 one	 of	







the	 effect	 that	 ‘the	 process	 is	 the	 punishment’.	 Certainly	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 is	 a	 range	 of	
adverse	consequences	that	flow	from	being	remanded	in	custody	as	distinct	from	being	granted	
bail,	 the	most	severe	of	which	 is	death	 in	custody	(see	generally	Brown	et	al.	2011:	166‐191)	
along	with	a	range	of	effects	on	health,	physical	and	mental	(Indig	et	al.	2010,	2011).	While	 it	
might	be	argued	that	punishment	 is	not	 the	aim	or	 intention	of	remand	 in	custody,	 it	 is	 likely	
that	the	accused,	who	is	yet	to	be	found	or	to	plead	guilty,	may	well	experience	remand	custody	




the	 ability	 to	 secure	 a	 fair	 trial;	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 guilty	 pleas,	 conviction	 and	 a	
sentence	of	imprisonment;	the	criminogenic	effect	of	mixing	with	sentenced	prisoners	and	high	
risk	 remandees;	 and	 the	 unavailability	 of	 rehabilitation	 programs	 to	 remandees	 (Grunseit,	








Fifthly,	 the	 legislative	 structuring	 of	 differential	 rules	 for	 defendants	 according	 to	 offence	
categories	 and	 previous	 offences,	 together	with	 the	 shift	 from	 concern	 about	 attendance	 and	
integrity	of	 the	 trial	process	 to	 crime	prevention,	has	arguably	produced	a	 system	of	massive	
and	 largely	 unacknowledged,	 or	 backdoor,	 pre‐trial	 preventive	 detention,	 which	 in	 numbers	
dwarfs	 the	 formal	 systems	 of	 preventive	 detention	 such	 as	 those	 which	 provide	 for	 post‐
sentence	detention	or	supervision	of	serious	sex	offenders.	Between	2003	and	2009,	across	the	
five	Australian	States	that	provided	for	post‐sentence	detention	or	supervision,	165	applications	






2,500	 persons,	 are	 unconvicted,	 as	 at	 2011,	 only	 two	 persons	 in	 NSW	 were	 serving	 post‐
sentence	detention	orders	(Baldry	et	al.	2011).	The	differences	do	not	end	there.	The	hearings	of	
applications	 by	 the	 Crown	 for	 post‐sentence	 detention	 orders	 involve	 high	 quality	 legal	
representation,	 the	 adducing	 of	 extensive	 evidence,	 including	 from	 psychologists	 and	
psychiatrists	 and	 often	 involving	 risk	 assessment	 instruments,	 full	 forensic	 argument	 and	
detailed	 judicial	 consideration	by	 a	 Supreme	Court	 judge.	 In	 contrast,	 in	many	bail	 decisions,	
accused	persons	are	unrepresented	or	represented	by	busy	duty	solicitors,	decisions	are	made	




around	 categories	 of	 offence	 charged	and	prior	 offences,	 rather	 than	 full	 consideration	of	 the	
individual	circumstances	of	the	individual	case.		
	








curfews,	 non‐association	 conditions,	 conditions	 that	 specify	 where	 the	 person	 must	 reside,	
where	they	can	go,	what	reasonable	directions	they	must	observe,	and	not	to	consume	alcohol	
and	 drugs.	 While	 these	 are	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘conditions’,	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 sought	 to	
distinguish	between	conditions	as	a	requirement	that	must	be	met	before	release	can	take	place	





impairments.	 Young	 people,	 in	 particular,	 are	 being	 set	 up	 to	 fail.	 The	 current	 position	 was	
succinctly	summarised	by	 the	Chief	Magistrate	of	 the	NSW	Local	Court	 in	a	submission	 to	 the	
NSW	LRC.	
	
Overly	 complex	 or	 onerous	 reporting	 requirements	 that	 go	 beyond	 those	






















She	 was	 subsequently	 arrested	 in	 Kings	 Cross	 again	 sharing	 needles,	 and	 was	
taken	 into	 custody.	An	application	 for	bail	was	made	before	 the	 court,	 and	bail	
was	 granted	 with	 the	 same	 conditions,	 namely	 that	 she	 not	 go	 within	 1000	
metres	of	Kings	Cross	railway	station.	
	








the	experience	of	Legal	Aid	solicitors	 it	 is	 standard	practice	at	Bidura	Court	 for	
magistrates	 in	 such	 cases	 to	 impose	 a	 place	 restriction	 encompassing	 a	 2	 km	
radius	 from	 Sydney	 Town	 Hall.	 The	 magistrate	 accordingly	 imposed	 this	
condition,	giving	no	consideration	to	the	fact	that	the	defendant	would	breach	the	
























Many	 of	 the	 examples	 set	 out	 by	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 or	 provided	 by	 legal	 services	 in	 the	 field,	
illustrate	the	way	that	bail	is	being	pressed	into	service	as	a	new	form	or	lever	of	control	which	
extends	 far	 beyond	 crime	 or	 crime	 prevention.	 Despite	 the	 criticism	 of	 Freiberg	 and	Morgan	
that:	 ‘the	 concepts	 of	 “conviction”	 and	 “sentence”	 have	 been	 eroded	 by	 the	 proliferation	 of	
dispositions	 in	the	form	of	diversion	programs	and	orders’	(2004:	221)	and	that	 ‘the	 limits	of	















governing	 individuals	 towards	 safer	 and	 healthier	 lifestyles	 and	 living	 conditions,	which	 it	 is	
hoped	will	also	reduce	offending.		
	
The	heavy	weight	 that	bail	 is	 increasingly	asked	 to	bear	and	 the	significant	distance	 travelled	
from	 the	 principle	 of	 no	 punishment	 without	 due	 process	 are	 exemplified	 in	 the	 following	
example	cited	by	the	NSW	LRC.		
	
Carl	 is	 twelve	 years	 old	 and	 has	 a	 cognitive	 impairment	 that	 means	 he	 often	
misbehaves	and	is	difficult	to	control.	As	a	result	he	 lives	 in	supported	housing,	





While	 having	 every	 sympathy	 for	 those	 charged	 with	 assisting	 and	 managing	 cognitively	
impaired	and	unruly	young	people,	there	is	a	fundamental	question	about	the	appropriateness	
of	the	threat	of	remand	in	custody	for	not	eating	your	dinner.	The	LRC	described	such	cases	as	
examples	 of	 ‘inappropriate,	 welfare	 oriented	 or	 overly	 onerous	 conditions’	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	
para.	12.29).	In	this	example	law	is	being	deployed	far	beyond	its	sphere	of	competence,	a	move	
which	undermines	its	legitimacy	and	credibility.	Any	link	to	crime	or	even	crime	prevention	has	
been	 lost	 here;	 bail	 law	 is	 being	 drafted	 in	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 mundane	 management	 of	 social,	





the	police	has	produced	a	significant	 increase	 in	revocations	of	bail,	particularly	 in	relation	to	
young	 persons.	 In	 NSW	 in	 2001,	 there	 were	 6%	 of	 detentions	 for	 breach	 relative	 to	 total	
detentions	 of	 juveniles	 pending	 completion	 of	 proceedings.	 That	 figure	 had	 increased	 to	
between	 20%	 and	 23%	 from	 2007	 onwards.	 Greater	 levels	 of	 police	 enforcement	 are	 also	























measure	 of	 their	 work	 rate	 which	 can	 be	 counted	 and	 thus	 readily	 applied	 to	 ‘productivity	
rates’,	local	area	command	assessments,	and	promotion	prospects.	In	this	somewhat	backhand	
way,	without	 explicit	 amendment	 to	 the	 bail	 legislation	 or	 clear	 parliamentary	 debate,	 crime	
prevention	 through	 significantly	 increased	 police	monitoring	 of	 bail	 conditions	 has	 become	 a	
new	part	of	the	function	of	bail	
	
The	 police	 have	 taken	 to	 this	 enhanced	 task	 and	 the	 KPIs	 by	 which	 they	 themselves	 are	
increasingly	 evaluated,	 with	 evident	 relish.	 Police	 Annual	 Reports	 refer	 to	 ‘nightly	 bail	
compliance	checks,	particularly	on	juveniles’	and	the	allocation	of	‘Bail	Compliance	Operations’	
as	 a	 ‘key	 outlook’	 (NSW	 Police	 Force	 2008:	 15;	 Young	 2010:	 8).	 Specific	 police	 targeting	
operations	 such	 as	 ‘Operation	 Avert’,	 a	 bi‐annual	 program	 which	 targets	 outstanding	 arrest	
warrants	 and	 bail	 compliance,	 have	 drawn	 high	 police	 and	 political	 praise.	 For	 example	 the	
results	 of	 one	weekend	 state‐wide	 operation	which	 resulted	 in	 89	 arrests	 for	 breach	 of	 bail	
were	 described	 by	 Deputy	 Commissioner	 Owens	 as	 demonstrating	 ‘an	 effective	 strategy	 in	
putting	offenders	before	the	courts’	(NSW	Police	Force		2010:	1‐2,	cited	in	Young	2010:	8).	Then	
Minister	 for	 Police,	 Michael	 Daley,	 expressed	 similar	 sentiments	 about	 earlier	 operations	
declaring,	‘[p]olice	aren’t	sitting	on	their	hands	…	they’re	well	and	truly	on	the	front	foot,	taking	
known	 criminals	 off	 the	 street’	 (Daley	 2009:	 1).	 The	 ‘high	 visibility’	 Operation	Avert	 in	 2013	
conducted	over	three	days,	included	1903	bail	compliance	checks	which	contributed	to	charges	
for	940	 ‘offences,	 including	…	breach	of	bail’,	and	was	judged	by	Assistant	Commissioner	Alan	







1978	(NSW)	s50	(1)(a)).	Further	 there	 is	no	evidence	 that	higher	remand	rates	 translate	 into	
safer	communities	(Noetic	Solutions	2011:78;	Vingnaendra	et	al.	2009:	4).	Fishwick	and	Bolitho	
note	 the	 inconsistency	 of	 pursuing	 the	 objective	 of	 ‘keep[ing]	 the	 community	 safe	 through	






country	 town	revealed	widespread	disquiet	among	 local	 lawyers	about	police	bail	compliance	
tactics,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 Aboriginal	 children	 (Young	 2010).	 One	 judicial	 officer	
interviewed	 referred	 to	 a	 case	 of	 a	 defendant	 who	 breached	 his	 daily	 reporting	 condition	
because	 he	 was	 bailed	 to	 an	 address	 30km	 out	 of	 town,	 despite	 having	 no	 history	 of	
unreliability,	 saying	 the	 police	 ‘were	 just	 narking	 him,	 that’s	 all	 they	 were	 doing	 …	 it’s	
transparent	 that	 they	 put	 conditions	 of	 bail	 in	 place	…	 to	 create	 hardship	 for	 people’	 (Young	
2010:	 14‐15).	 One	 local	 legal	 practitioner	 stated	 that	 there	 is	 an	 ‘awful	 lot	 of	 extra	 curial	
punishment	 in	bail	 conditions’	but	 ‘you’re	not	allowed	to	say	 that’	 (Young	2010:	16).	Curfews	
were	the	most	complained	about	condition	with	many	stories	of	young	people	being	breached	
in	 circumstances	where	 their	 parents	were	 responsible	 for	 taking	 them	 out	 after	 the	 curfew	
(Young	2010:	17).	One	practitioner	asked:	what	was	his	client	‘Karina’,	a	13	year	old	Aboriginal	
girl	to	do;	‘walk	back	home	...	in	the	hours	of	darkness	…	placing	her	on	the	vulnerable	list	…	or	
was	 she	 to	 stay	 there	 safe	with	 family	 and	 run	 the	 gauntlet	 that	 the	 police	 do	 not	 go	 to	 her	
residence’	(Young	2010:	17).	Another	practitioner	highlighted	the	case	of	‘Sarah’,	a	13	year	old	






arrest.	 It’s	punishment	pre‐sentence’	 (Young	2010:	18).	Night	 curfews	were	often	 imposed	 in	
relation	to	minor	offences	such	as	shoplifting	which	were	alleged	to	have	occurred	during	the	
day.	 One	 practitioner	 claimed	 that	 10pm	 and	 2am	 curfew	 checks	 are	 ‘all	 the	 Night	 Shift	 are	













was	 committed	 in	 the	afternoon),	 it	 had	a	particularly	harsh	 impact	because	of	
the	police	practice	of	‘bail	compliance	checks’.		
	
For	 several	 weeks,	 police	 turned	 up	 almost	 every	 night	 (sometime	 between	




























she	was	 required	 to	 report	 daily	 to	 the	 police.	 On	 one	 particular	 day	 her	 one‐
year‐old	 child	 was	 very	 sick,	 vomiting	 so	 much	 as	 to	 suffer	 dehydration.	 As	 a	







explanation	 or	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 charges	 were	 minor	 and	 unlikely	 to	 attract	 a	
custodial	sentence.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.39,	Example	12.7)	
	
Julie	 Stubbs	 notes	 that	 ‘data	 indicate	 a	 250%	 increase	 in	 arrests	 for	 outstanding	 warrants	
and/or	breach	of	bail	from	2003‐04	to	2007‐08’	across	both	adults	and	juveniles	(Stubbs	2010:	
496‐7).	The	Police	 submission	 to	 the	NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	 inquiry	 strongly	 justified	
this	 pattern	 of	 compliance	 checking	 as	 being	 ‘in	 line	 with	 [NSW	 Police	 Force]	 strategies	 of	
predominantly	 targeting	high‐risk	 (being	 recidivist,	 serious	and	violent)	offenders’	 (NSW	LRC	





added].	 Juveniles	 on	 conditional	 bail	 known	 for	 offences	with	 a	 similar	modus	
operandi	 had	 curfew	 checks	 conducted	 on	 them	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 incident	 was	
reported	to	rule	them	out	as	possible	suspects.	
	





The	 NSW	 Police	 Force	 …	 states	 that	 the	 number	 of	 bail	 compliance	 checks	
conducted	per	month	on	young	people	has	increased	approximately	400%	from	






rise	 in	 remand	 rates	 in	 relation	 to	 young	 people.	 Briefly,	 the	 number	 of	 young	
people	 remanded	 for	 breach	 of	 bail	 conditions	 only	 has	 increased	 from	193	 in	
2000‐01	to	1142	in	2010‐11.	The	average	length	of	stay	for	a	young	person	who	









and	 lesbians	will	be	given	a	get‐out‐of‐jail‐free	 card	under	proposals	 to	 soften	 the	 state’s	bail	
laws	currently	before	Attorney	General’);	MediaWatch	2012).	These	attacks	continued	once	the	





to	 the	Report	 (NSW	Government	2012).	The	response	 indicated	 that	a	new	Bail	Act	would	be	
introduced	 in	 2013	 that	 will	 do	 away	 with	 offence‐based	 presumptions	 and	move	 to	 a	 risk‐





The	 NSW	 LRC	 Report	 had	 recommended	 a	 uniform	 presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 bail	 for	 all	
offences.	The	response	stated	that:	
	
The	 Government	 anticipates	 that	 dispensing	 with	 the	 system	 of	 presumptions	
will	 not	 only	 simplify	 the	 bail	 decision	 making	 process,	 but	 will	 also	 result	 in	
fewer	 amendments	 to	 the	 legislation	 enabling	 it	 to	 remain	 simple	 and	 clear,	 as	




As	 foreshadowed	by	 the	Attorney	General,	 the	Bill	 abolishes	 the	 system	of	presumptions	and	
moves	 to	 an	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’	 test.	 A	 bail	 authority	 is	 to	 consider	 whether	 there	 is	 any	
‘unacceptable	risk’	that	an	accused	person	will	fail	to	appear;	commit	a	serious	offence,	which	is	
not	 specifically	 defined	 but	 includes	 sexual	 or	 violent	 offences	 or	 offences	 where	 there	 was	
alleged	use	of	an	offensive	weapon;	endanger	the	safety	of	victims;	or	interfere	with	witnesses.	
Bail	 can	 only	 be	 refused	 if	 there	 is	 an	 unacceptable	 risk	 that	 cannot	 be	 mitigated	 by	 the	
imposition	of	bail	conditions.	Bail	conditions	can	only	be	imposed	for	the	purpose	of	mitigating	
an	unacceptable	risk.	A	 flow	chart	outlining	 the	basic	 ‘unacceptable	risk’	bail	decision‐making	
process	is	included	in	the	Bill.		
	
A	 bail	 authority	 is	 required	 to	 have	 regard	 to	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 the	 general	




be	more	 onerous	 than	 is	 necessary	 to	mitigate	 that	 risk’	 and	 compliance	with	 the	 conditions	
must	be	‘reasonably	practical’	(Smith	2013).	The	types	of	condition	mirror	those	in	the	existing	
Act.	The	Bill	specifies	the	actions	a	police	officer	can	take	in	relation	to	failure	to	comply	with	a	
bail	 acknowledgement	 or	 bail	 conditions.	 The	 officer	 may	 ‘decide	 to	 take	 no	 action,	 issue	 a	
warning,	issue	an	application	notice	or	court	attendance	notice	to	the	person	requiring	them	to	
attend	court,	arrest	the	person,	or	apply	for	an	arrest	warrant’	(Smith	2013).	The	Bill	retains	the	
controversial	 provision,	 s	 22A,	 which	 restricted	 second	 or	 subsequent	 release	 applications	




Act	 to	 commence	 operation	 approximately	 12	 months	 from	 the	 date	 of	 its	 assent.	 This	 is	











increase	 in	 the	 frequency	of	bail	 revocations	 (NSW	LRC	2012:	paras	4.8‐4.31).	Where	NSW	 is	
distinctive	 is	 that	 the	 predominant	 driver	 of	 the	 increases	 has	 been	 a	 form	 of	 legislative	







As	 well	 as	 charting	 these	 developments	 the	 article	 has	 attempted	 to	 delineate	 some	 of	 the	
underlying	processes	that	have	accompanied	increasing	remand	rates.	These	include	a	number	
of	conceptual	shifts	in	the	way	bail	is	conceived,	including	the	use	of	bail	for	crime	prevention	
purposes	 and	 an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 risk.	 These	 conceptual	 shifts	 are	 observable	 in	 the	
explosion	in	bail	conditions,	many	of	which	are	onerous	and	inappropriate,	and	the	KPI‐driven	
policing	of	bail	conditions	and	consequent	rise	in	revocations,	especially	in	relation	to	juveniles.	
The	 article	 has	 drawn	on	 the	NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	Report	 to	 illustrate	 and	 support	
some	of	 these	arguments.	This	 raises	 the	 issue	of	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	NSW	Government’s	
proposed	 Bail	 Bill	 2013,	 based	 partly	 on	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 Report,	 will	 address,	 alleviate	 or	
accelerate	the	various	processes	and	conceptual	shifts	argued	above.		
	
The	 simplest	 answer	 to	 that	 question	 is:	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen.	 It	 seems	 likely	 that	 such	 a	
significant	change	in	the	legislative	framework,	in	particular	sweeping	away	the	complex	system	
of	presumptions	in	favour	of	an	 ‘unacceptable	risk’	model,	will	have	both	direct	consequences	
and	will	 feed	 into	more	 complex	 and	mediated	 cultural	 and	 organisational	 changes.	However	
the	exact	relationship	between	legislative	provisions	and	the	social	and	organisational	contexts	
and	 cultural	 dispositions	 surrounding	 remand	 decision‐making	 and	 trends	 are	 difficult	 to	
delineate,	as	the	Sarre,	King	and	Bamford	(2006)	research	cited	earlier,	demonstrates.	A	study	
of	offending	on	bail	 in	England	found	that	 ‘the	changes	 in	remand	decision	making	…	seem	to	
reflect	broader	political	 and	media	debate	about	offending	on	bail	 rather	 than	changes	 in	 the	
legislation’	(Hucklesby	and	Marshall,	2000:	167).	(For	an	attempt	to	elaborate	on	the	notion	of	
penal	culture	and	its	relationship	to	rising	imprisonment	rates	in	Australia	and	elsewhere,	see	
Cunneen	 et	 al.	 2013.)	 The	 NSW	 Attorney‐General’s	 reference	 to	 the	 Bill	 as	 constituting	 a	
‘paradigm	shift’	and	the	delay	 to	enable	an	education	campaign	signifies	 that	more	than	mere	
cosmetic	changes	are	intended.	There	is	clearly	an	attempt	to	address	certain	of	the	conceptual	
shifts	 identified	above;	 for	example,	 in	 the	requirement	 that	 the	bail	 authority	have	regard	 to	
the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 the	 general	 right	 to	 be	 at	 liberty.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 clear	
intention	 to	 wind	 back	 the	 explosion	 in	 bail	 conditions	 and	 to	 reduce	 bail	 revocations	 by	














for	 a	myriad	 of	 reasons),	may	 interfere	with	witnesses	 or	 evidence,	 and	may	 commit	 further	
very	 serious	 crimes,	 from	 generalised	 fears	 of	 the	 various	 repercussions	 of	 such	 occurrences	
and	 from	 the	 plethora	 of	 technical,	 administrative	 breaches	 of	 bail	 conditions	 that	 are	 non‐
threatening.	 It	may	be	 that	 the	debate	 surrounding	 the	 Law	Reform	Commission	 Inquiry	 and	
Report	and	the	Attorney	General’s	response	has	already	had	an	effect	on	bail	decision‐makers	
and	 on	 the	 complex	 organisational	 and	 cultural	 climate,	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 a	more	 ‘resilient’	









Correspondence:	 David	 Brown,	 Professor,	 Crime	 and	 Justice	 Research	 Centre,	 Faculty	 of	 Law,	
Queensland	University	of	Technology,	Brisbane	Qld	4000.	Email:	d19.brown@qut.edu.au	
	
	
																																																													
1		 The	author	was	a	part‐time	Law	Reform	Commissioner	on	this	reference.	All	the	material	relied	on	in	the	article	is	
publically	available	in	the	published	Report	or	in	submissions	to	the	LRC	by	a	range	of	groups	and	organisations,	
submissions	available	on	the	NSW	LRC	website.	The	author	wishes	to	thank	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	their	
helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.	
	
	
References	
ABS	(2011)	Prisoners	in	Australia	2010	Cat	No	4517.0.	Canberra:	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	
ABS	(2012)	Prisoners	in	Australia	2011	Cat	No	4517.0.	Canberra:	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	
Akland	R	(2012)	Bombastic	voices	aiming	to	shout	down	the	Attorney	General.	Sydney	Morning	
Herald,	10	February.		
Baker	T	and	Simon	J	(2002)	Embracing	Risk.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press.	
Baldry	E,	Brown	D,	Brown	M,	Cunneen	C,	Schwartz	M	and	Steel	A	(2011)	Imprisoning	
rationalities.	Australian	and	New	Zealand	Journal	of	Criminology	44(1):	24‐40.		
Bamford	D,	King	S	and	Sarre	R	(1999a)	Remand	in	custody	in	three	Australian	jurisdictions.	
Research	and	Public	Policy	Series	No	23.	Canberra:	Australian	Institute	of	Criminology.		
Bamford	D,	King	S	and	Sarre	R	(1999b)	Report	to	the	Criminology	Research	Council	on	Remand	in	
Custody	in	SA,	WA	and	Victoria.	Canberra;	Criminology	Research	Council.	
Bargen	J	(2009‐2010)	Embedding	diversion	and	limiting	the	use	of	bail	in	NSW:	A	consideration	
of	the	issues	related	to	achieving	and	embedding	diversion	into	juvenile	justice	practices.	
Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	21(3):	467‐479.	
Beck	U	(1992)	Risk	Society.	New	York:	Sage.	
Booth	T	and	Townsley	L	(2009)	The	process	is	the	punishment:	The	case	of	bail	in	New	South	
Wales	Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	21(1):	41‐58.	
Boyle	K	(2009)	‘The	more	things	change	…’:	Bail	and	the	incarceration	of	homeless	young	
people.	Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	21(1)	59‐78.	
Brown	D,	Egger	S,	Farrier	D,	McNamara	L,	Steel	A,	Grewcock	M	and	Spears	D	(2011)	Criminal	
Laws	(5th	edn).	Sydney:	The	Federation	Press.	
Chilvers	M,	Allen	J	and	Doak	P	(2002)	Absconding	on	bail.	Crime	and	Justice	Bulletin,	No	68	
Contemporary	Issues	in	Crime	and	Justice	Series.	Sydney:	NSW	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	
and	Research.	
Clennell	A	(2012)	How	DPP	Greg	Smith	went	from	Rambo	to	cream	puff	with	stance	on	
sentencing	in	NSW.	Daily	Telegraph,	24	January.	
Clennell	A	(2012a)	Attorney‐General	Greg	Smith	is	reviewing	bail	laws	for	gays	and	lesbians.	
Daily	Telegraph,	1	February.	
Clennell	A	(2012b)	Special	bail	for	minorities.	Daily	Telegraph,	14	June.	
Clennell	A	(2012c)	O’Farrell	vows	not	to	go	soft	on	bail.	Daily	Telegraph,	15	June.	
Clennell	A	(2012d)	Freeing	up	bail	would	be	a	crime.	Daily	Telegraph,	7	August.	
Colvin	E	(2009)	Police	bail	decision‐making	in	Victoria:	Private	decisions,	public	consequences.	
In	Segrave	M	(ed)	Australia	and	New	zealand	Critical	Criminology	Conference	Proceedings,	8‐9	
July.	Melbourne:	Monash	University:	51‐59.	
Cunneen	C,	Baldry	E,	Brown	D,	Brown	M,	Schwartz	M	and	Steel	A	(2013	forthcoming)	Penal	
Culture	and	Hyperincarceration:	The	Revival	of	the	Prison.	Ashgate:	London.		
David	Brown:	Looking	Behind	the	Increase	in	Custodial	Remand	Populations	
	
IJCJ&	SD					97	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(2)	
Daley	M	(2009)	Police	arrest	more	than	850	in	three	day	blitz.	Press	release	from	the	Office	of	
the	NSW	Minister	for	Police,	16	November.		
Feeley	M	(1979)	The	Process	is	the	Punishment.	New	York:	Russell	Sage	Foundation.	
Fishwick	E	and	Bolitho	J	(2010)	Politics‐led	policy	and	policy‐led	evidence:	The	Noetic	review	of	
juvenile	justice	in	New	South	Wales.	Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	22(1):	171‐180.	
Fitzgerald	J	(2009)	Why	are	Indigenous	imprisonment	rates	rising?	Crime	and	Justice	Statistics,	
Bureau	Brief	Issue	Paper	No	41.	Sydney:	NSW	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	and	Research	
Fitzgerald	J	and	Weatherburn	D	(2004)	The	impact	of	the	Bail	Amendment	(Repeat	Offenders)	
Act	2002.	Crime	and	Justice	Bulletin	No	83	Contemporary	Issues	in	Crime	and	Justice	Series.	
Sydney:	NSW	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	and	Research.	
Freiberg	A	and	Morgan	N	(2004)	Between	bail	and	sentence:	The	conflation	of	dispositional	
options.	Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	15(3):	220‐236.	
Grunseit	A,	Forell	S	and	McCarron	(2008)	Taking	Justice	into	Custody:	The	Legal	Needs	of	
Prisoners.	Sydney:	Law	and	Justice	Foundation	of	NSW.	
Hannah‐Moffat	K	and	Maurutto	P	(2013)	Shifting	and	targeted	forms	of	penal	governance:	Bail,	
punishment	and	specialized	courts.	Theoretical	Criminology	16(2):	201‐219.	
Hatzistergos	J	(2007)	Bail	Amendment	Bill.	NSW	Parliamentary	Debates,	Legislative	Council.	
Hansard,	17	October:	2670.	
Hucklesby	A	and	Marshall	E	(2000)	Tackling	offending	on	bail.	Howard	Journal	of	Criminal	
Justice	39:	150‐170.	
Hucklesby	A	(2009)	Keeping	the	lid	on	the	prison	remand	population:	The	experience	of	
England	and	Wales.	Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	21(1):	3‐23.	
Humphries,	D.	(2012)	Smith	stands	up	to	critics	to	make	bail	a	balance	of	cost	and	justice.	
Sydney	Morning	Herald,	16	June.	
Indig	D,	Topp	L,	Bronwen	R,	Mamoon	H,	Border	B,	Kumar	S	and	McNamara	M	(2010)	2009	NSW	
Inmate	Health	Survey:	Key	Findings	Report.	Sydney:	Justice	Health.	
Indig	D,	Vecchiato	C,	Haysom	L,	Beilby	R,	Carter	J,	Champion	U,	Gaskin	C,	Heller	E,	Kumar	S,	
Mamone	N,	Muir	P,	van	den	Dolder	P	and	Whitton	G	(2011)	2009	NSW	Young	People	in	
Custody	Health	Survey:	Full	Report.	Sydney:	Justice	Health	and	Juvenile	Justice.	
King	S,	Bamford	D	and	Sarre	R	(2008)	The	remand	strategy:	Assessing	outcomes.	Current	Issues	
in	Criminal	Justice	19(3):	327‐344.		
King	S,	Bamford	D	and	Sarre	R	(2009)	Discertionary	decision‐making	in	a	dynamic	context:	The	
influences	on	remand	decision‐makers	in	two	Australian	jurisdictions.	Current	Issues	in	
Criminal	Justice	21(1):	24‐40.	
McFarlane	K	(2010)	From	care	to	custody:	Young	women	in	out‐of	home	care	in	the	criminal	
justice	system.	Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	22(2):	345‐353.	
MediaWatch	(2012)	ABC1.	Episode	3,	20	February.	
Ministry	of	Justice	(2013)	Story	of	the	Prison	Population:	1993‐2012	England	and	Wales.	United	
Kingdom:	Ministry	of	Justice.	
Noetic	Solutions	(2011)	A	Strategic	Review	of	the	New	South	Wales	Juvenile	Justice	System,	
Sydney:	Report	for	the	Minister	of	Juvenile	Justice.	
NSW	DJJ	(2013)	Key	Service	Measures:	Average	daily	measures	of	young	people	in	custody	by	
month.	NSW	Juvenile	Justice,	Department	of	Attorney	General	and	Justice.	Available	at	
http://www.djj.nsw.gov.au/statistics_custody.htm	(accessed	6	August	2013).	
NSW	Government	(2010)	State	Plan.	Sydney:	NSW	Government,	Department	of	Premier	and	
Cabinet.	
NSW	Government	(2012)	NSW	Government	Response	to	the	NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	Report	
on	Bail.	November.	
David	Brown:	Looking	Behind	the	Increase	in	Custodial	Remand	Populations	
	
IJCJ&	SD					98	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(2)	
NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	(NSW	LRC)	(2012)	Bail.	Report	No	133.	Sydney,	available	on	
http://www.lawreform.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc/lrc_r133toc.html	(accessed	25	July	2013).	
NSW	Police	Force	(2008)	Annual	Report	2007‐2008		
NSW	Police	Force	(2010)	‘More	than	900	people	charged	with	1,173	offences	–	Operation	Avert	
6’	Media	Release,	25	October		
NSW	Police	Force	(2013)	Hundreds	arrested	following	blitz	on	wanted	persons	–	Op	Avert	11.	
NSW	Government,	NSW	Police	Force	Press	Release,	15	April.	
NZ	Department	of	Corrections	(2011)	Offender	Volumes	Report	2011.	Available	at	
http://www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/offender‐volumes‐report.html	(accessed	5	June	
2013).	
O’Malley	P	(2000)	Uncertain	subjects,	risk,	liberalism	and	contract.	Economy	and	Society	29:	
460‐484.	
O’Malley	P	(2004)	Risk,	Uncertainty	and	Government.	London:	Cavendish.	
O’Malley	P	(2013)	Uncertain	governance	and	resilient	subjects	in	the	risk	society.	Onati	Socio‐
Legal	Series	3(2):	180‐195.	Available	at	http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221288	(accessed	20	
May	2013).	
Patty	A	(2012)	Bail	for	youth	must	be	easier,	review	finds.	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	14	June.	
Patty	A	(2012a)	NSW	to	back	turnaround	on	bail	conditions.	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	27	June.	
Patty	A	(2013)	Law	reform	let	down	by	politics.	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	8	April.	
Porter	L	and	Calverley	D	(2011)	Trends	in	the	Use	of	Remand	in	Canada.	Statistics	Canada.	
Available	at	http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85‐002‐x/2011001/article/11440‐eng.htm	
(accessed	5	May	2013).		
Richards	K	and	Lyneham	M	(2010)	Juveniles	in	detention	in	Australia,	1981‐2008.	AIC	
Monitoring	Reports	12.	Canberra:	Australian	Institute	of	Criminology.	
Ringland	C	and	Weatherburn	D	(2010)	The	decline	in	unconditional	release	before	trial.	Crime	
and	Justice	Statistics,	Bureau	Brief	Issue	Paper	No	55.	Sydney:	NSW	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	
and	Research.	
Sarre	R,	King	S	and	Bamford	D	(2006)	Remand	in	Custody:	Critical	factors	and	key	issues.	Trends	
and	Issues	in	Crime	and	Criminal	Justice	No	310.	Canberra:	Australian	Institute	of	
Criminology:	1‐6.	
Smith	G	(2013)	Second	reading	Speech,	Bail	Bill	2013.	Hansard:	1	May.	
Steel	A	(2009)	Bail	in	Australia:	Legislative	introduction	and	amendment	since	1970.	Paper	
presented	at	the	Australia	and	New	Zealand	Critical	Criminology	Conference	Proceedings,	8‐9	
July.	Melbourne:	Monash	University:	228‐243.	
Stubbs	J	(2010)	Re‐examining	bail	and	remand	for	young	people	in	NSW.	Australian	and	New	
Zealand	Journal	of	Criminology	43(3):	485‐505.	
Taylor	M	(2013)	Bail	out.	Justinian,	Sunday	May	19.	
Victorian	Law	Reform	Commission	(VLRC)	(2007)	Review	of	the	Bail	Act,	Final	Report.	
Young	C	(2010)	Not	guilty	and	not	yet	innocent:	Police	attitudes	towards	bail	compliance	and	
the	consequences	for	children	and	young	people.	Sydney:	Australian	Prison	Project,	
University	of	NSW	(unpublished	report).		
Webster	C,	Doob	A,	and	Myers	N	(2009)	The	parable	of	Ms	Baker:	Understanding	pre‐trial	
detention	in	Canada.	Current	Issues	in	Criminal	Justice	21(1)	79‐102.	
Wong	K,	Bailey	D	and	Kenny	T	(2009)	Bail	Me	Out:	NSW	Young	Offenders	and	Bail.	Sydney:	Youth	
Justice	Coalition.	
Zedner	L	(2007)	Fixing	the	future?	The	pre‐emptive	turn	in	criminal	justice.	In	Bronnit	S,	
McSherry	B	and	Norrie	A	(eds)	Regulating	Deviance:	The	Redirection	of	Criminalisation	and	
the	Futures	of	Criminal	Law.	Oxford:	Hart	Publishing:	57‐78.	
David	Brown:	Looking	Behind	the	Increase	in	Custodial	Remand	Populations	
	
IJCJ&	SD					99	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(2)	
Zedner	L	(2009)	Pre‐crime	and	post‐criminology?	Theoretical	Criminology	11(2):	261‐281.	
Zedner	L	(2011)	Erring	on	the	side	of	safety:	Risk	assessment,	expert	knowledge	and	the	
criminal	court.	In	Dennis	I	and	Sullivan	GR	(eds)	Seeking	Security:	Pre‐empting	the	
Commission	of	Criminal	Harms.	Oxford:	Hart	Publishing:	219‐242.	
	
Legislation	
Bail	Act	1978	(NSW)	
Summary	Offences	Act	(NSW)	1988	
Bail	Bill	(NSW)	2013	
	
Cases	
R	v	Wakefield	(1969)	83	WN	(Pt	1)	(NSW)	300	
	
